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Although for most people the current
struggle over Jerusalem appears as a straight-
forward contest between Israel and the Pales-
tinians over the division of the city, with the
Palestinians viewing East Jerusalem as an
integral part of the West Bank, which was
occupied in the June 1967 war, and the Is-
raelis claiming the whole of the city as their
capital, Wasserstein injects a dose of his-
torical perspective by pointing out that the
Jerusalem question in its modern form “ﬁrst
emerged as a by-product of the slow melt-
down of the Ottoman empire . . . its central
feature in its ﬁrst phase being the strug-
gle over the Christian holy places” (p. 15).
The author seems deliberately to distance
himself from a colonial perspective, but,
although not unsympathetic to Palestinian
claims for independence and statehood, he
is anchored ﬁrmly in a narrative based on
Israeli needs and interests.
Although Wasserstein documents the
attitudes of Jews, Christians, and Muslims to-
ward the Holy City and shows that, contrary
to polemical and propagandistic claims, the
attachment of the various protagonists to
the city is much more modern than claimed
by the various parties involved, he makes
clear that the current conﬂict is not reli-
gious in nature. He also shows that as far as
the inhabitants of the city are concerned,
historically intercommunal relations on the
whole were “contained within a framework
of law and civil peace” (p. 43). Despite the
formal existence of separate residential quar-
ters for the various religious denominations
stretching back to the days of Ottoman rule,
these neighborhoods never were hermeti-
cally sealed; no physical markers separated
them, and to some extent residence was
mixed. Muslims in particular lived in all four
quarters, and Jews were to be found both
living and conducting their commercial ac-
tivities in the Muslim Quarter as far back as
the 1870s (p. 49). During the whole of the
lateOttomanperiod, therewere no recorded
instances of signiﬁcant mass communal vio-
lence. It was only with the advent of political
Zionism and the arrival in the city of British
authority that communal hostilities began to
manifest themselves.
The last thirty-ﬁve years of Israeli rule
over the whole of Jerusalem have effected
fundamental changes in the demographic
composition of the city. Although it is difﬁ-
cult to deny the author’s characterization of
the continued separation of the two com-
munities living in Jerusalem and to ﬁnd fault
with his claim that “Arabs and Jews inhabit
different mental worlds, informed by fun-
damentally different ideological axioms, in-
fected with profound collective suspicions
of each other” (p. xiv), it is difﬁcult in the
absence of a war or a similar cataclysmic
event to visualize how the city can be re-
divided again, or whether this is desirable
at all in the currently existing situation. Is-
raeli policy aimed right from the start of the
occupation of the Arab inhabited parts of
Jerusalem in June 1967 to carry out physi-
cal transformations that would make it well
nigh impossible to partition the city again.
In their occupation policies, Israeli authori-
ties have been resoundingly successful. Not
only has the Old City been transformed,
with the razing of the old Moroccan Quarter
and the rebuilding of a modern and much
enlarged Jewish Quarter in its place, but
also the string of Jewish settlements built
in East Jerusalem and ringing the Old City
have ensured that the Arab inhabitants of
East Jerusalem are now a minority even in
their ghettolike part of the city.
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Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler
have produced one of the most interesting
volumes I have read in the past decade. They
have two major aims: to offer a paradigmatic
reformulation of the ﬁeld of political econ-
omy and to use their approach to reanalyze
major trends within Israeli economics, pol-
itics, society, and even history. Throughout
the book, they vehemently and correctly
try to discredit mainstream Israeli social
science, focusing predominantly on those
academic economists and other players in
positions of power in the state bureaucracy
and mass media who have monopolized
economic discourse without allowing for
alternative voices. These actors imposed
their quasi-neoliberal (in fact, neoconserva-
tive) worldview to provide legitimacy for a
completely capitalist socioeconomic order.
Baruch Kimmerling is George S. Wise
Professor of Sociology at the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem.
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The authors’ “new” political economy of-
fers a combined reading of the two, usually
separate ﬁelds of economics and politics,
which they see “as part of a holistic pro-
cess of social change” (pp. 16–17). The
central tool in this process is the accu-
mulation of capital, which they deﬁne as
power over transnational cooperation. If
capital is a generalized and diffused power
over transnational cooperation, then every
power arrangement that systematically af-
fects the ﬂow of proﬁt is a potential facet
of capital. Thus, modern capitalists do not
aim simply for “proﬁt maximization” but
rather look to “beat[ing] the average” (p.
41). Capital holders’/owners’ aims can be
seen as relative rather than absolute gains,
or “differential accumulation” (pp. 16–18).
This accumulation should be understood
as an interaction between productivity and
power. In the modern capitalist world, accu-
mulation depends not merely on ownership
and inputs into the productive process but
also becomes a product of sociopolitical
power.
Having outlined their new theoretical
framework of differential accumulation,
the authors trace the history of Israel’s
power structure from the early 1900s pre-
independence Palestine to the transnational
nature of the modern-day dominant capital
groups. They place the rise and consolida-
tion of Israel’s ruling capitalist class at the
center of the capitalist development pro-
cess, which, they contend, has become em-
bedded in, and increasingly interconnected
with, the broader context of regional and
global change.
Their analysis of Israel’s present-day econ-
omy and power structure is based mainly on
the concepts of “absentee ownership,” cen-
tralization, transnationalization, and perma-
nent restructuring. They note that of the 652
companies listed on the Tel Aviv Stock Ex-
change in March 1999, a total of eighty-two
were controlled entirely or partly by ﬁve
wealthy families and accounted for 41 per-
cent of the market’s overall capitalization.
The remainder also manifested continuous
tendencies toward centralization accom-
panied by a transnationalization process.
(Between 1993 and 1998, foreign owner-
ship in the Tel Aviv stock market increased
from 3 percent to 14.4 percent.) As dom-
inant capital was transnationalized, by the
late 1990s two of the ﬁve top groups were
effectively in foreign control.
Analyzing the rise of these dominant
groups in the Jewish community of pre-1948
Palestine, the authors demonstrate how the
enterprises were brought under government
control and then nourished and protected by
the state in its early years. When Likud came
to power in 1977, the ruling class was ready
to beneﬁt from and push for the “depth
regime,” which resulted from the worsen-
ing security situation, the worsening plight
of trade union power, economic stagﬂa-
tion, and the increasing removal of market
and trade barriers. They contrast a “depth
regime”—in which differential capital accu-
mulation can be achieved by raising proﬁt
per employee faster than the average, inter-
nally through cost-cutting or externally by
raising prices—with a “breadth regime”—
in which dominant capital tries to beat the
average rate of proﬁt growth by expand-
ing employment faster than the average.
The authors contend that the neoliberals
thought they merely were removing govern-
ment controls from an otherwise compet-
itive economy. What they did in practice,
however, was to deregulate an oligopolistic
war economy, effectively inviting dominant
capital to take the lead.
There is one major omission in the vol-
ume: The authors ignore land and territo-
rial factors, which played, and continue
to play, such a crucial role in the do-
mestic Israeli distribution of power and
wealth, as well as in the Israeli-Palestinian
conﬂict. The authors mention that Pales-
tinian land and property were distributed
after 1949, but note only that “back-of-the-
envelope calculations . . . suggest that redis-
tribution was massive and probably highly
differential” (p. 86). Similarly, they contend
that their discussion of the allocation of
foreign capital inﬂow is limited because
their research was hampered by “ofﬁcial
secrecy” (ibid). In fact, however, much data
are available in my two books, Zionism
and Territory (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983) and Zionism and
Economy (Rochester, VT: Schenkman,
1983). This apparent ignorance of these
issues does not seem to be accidental. The
authors cite professional literature exten-
sively and occasional anecdotal references
from the Israeli media but consistently
omit or marginalize important research by
such scholars as Uri Ben-Eliezer, Deborah
Bernstein, Lev Grinberg, Sara Helman,
Uri Ram, Henry Rosenfeld, and Shlomo
Swirski (among others) whose similar ap-
proaches, arguments, and ﬁndings preceded
this book. These omissions convey a pre-
tense to originality but actually only lessen
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the credibility of the book and weaken its
arguments.
This failure to give credit recurs when the
authors address the inﬂux of a cheap, mo-
bile labor force with no social rights that was
incorporated by the occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza after the 1967 war. This labor
inﬂux ﬂooded the “small economy,” broke
the monopoly of the Histadrut on unionized
labor, and helped the Israeli bourgeoisie to
divide and conquer the labor market and to
lower wages. Nevertheless, the authors are
correct to undermine the conventional wis-
dom of Israel’s mainstream economists, who
usually assert that the occupied territories
are a net burden on Israel—ﬁrstly because
the availability of cheap Palestinian labor
reduces the incentive to invest in new tech-
nologies; and secondly, due to the need to
spend heavily on security. But the economic
annexation of over 900,000 Palestinians was
tantamount to a massive enlargement of
the overall market by about one-third and
concealed “some differential winners, par-
ticularly because the majority of the citizens
were hard hit,” making a mockery of aggre-
gate notions such as “‘societal welfare’ and
the ‘national interest” (p. 108).
Perhaps the most challenging argument
is Nitzan and Bichler’s rejection of another
commonly held view that there is nothing
capitalists hate more than volatility and un-
certainty. On the contrary, they assert that
“soon enough [since the 1970s], much of
the Israeli elite would be busy producing
weapons, peddling arms, and making sure
the Arab-Israeli conﬂict remained [a]live and
kicking” (pp. 103–104). Trying to identify
the winners of the Middle East conﬂicts
and energy crises of the 1970s and 1980s
that triggered processes of stagﬂation and
worldwide monetary instability, the authors
point to the increasing symbiosis among the
OPEC countries, oil companies, military con-
tractors, infrastructure companies, and key
ﬁnancial institutions—the “Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition”—that developed into
the commercialization and privatization of
the arms trade and the politicization of oil
resources. When the arms trade fell increas-
ingly into private hands during the 1960s, ne-
cessitating direct money payments for arms,
the market for arms imports moved from
Southeast Asia to the Middle East because
of the oil that could pay for it. The armed
conﬂicts and energy crises manifested in
the Middle East were not distinct phenom-
ena, but rather comprised part of a process
of capital accumulation by dominant capital
groups. While the authors demonstrate fairly
well that every time the “national interest”
came into conﬂict with the Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition, the policy stance al-
most invariably tilted in favor of the coalition,
they consistently fail to interrogate the ba-
sic question of who has the power to deﬁne
what comprises the “national interest.”
Israel, well equipped with high-skilled
human-power, quickly joined the hi-tech
“new economy” of the 1990s before it fell
into a deep crisis. Benjamin Netanyahu, ﬁrst
as prime minister and now as ﬁnance min-
ister, envisioned Israel as the “Silicon Valley
of the Eastern Hemisphere,” but he condi-
tioned this possibility on the complete liber-
alization, privatization, and globalization of
the economy. Nitzan and Bichler claim that,
while government rhetoric favored deregula-
tion of the markets to make themmore com-
petitive, in fact the organized institutions
of social power and authority were not any
weaker than in previous stages. In a sense,
privatization and deregulation have led to
the creation of themost concentrated corpo-
rate structure ever to exist in Israel. Instead
of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition,
a global “Technodollar-Mergerdollar Coali-
tion” has arisen, based on high technologies
and corporate amalgamation (pp. 33–34).
This economy is global on two accounts:
because foreign institutional investors have
penetrated every corner of the Israeli mar-
ket and because of domestic dominant cap-
ital’s search for investment paths abroad.
On the whole, however, the processes are
not symmetrical, and capital and techno-
logical knowledge are exported more than
they are imported. Under such changing
circumstances, since the beginning of the
1990s the big business community has be-
come a major supporter of the aborted Oslo
process.
The authors perceive this development
as the beginning of the end of Zionism,
because the dominant capital groups that
formerly had successfully combined capital
with Zionism (i.e., colonization) now had
vested interests in an end to the Arab-Israeli
conﬂict and the “garrison state,” which was
no longer instrumental for the new econ-
omy. This was true especially following the
eruption of the second Palestinian intifada,
where dominant capital was “torn between
its Zionist past and transnational aspirations”
(p. 297). The outcome was political paral-
ysis and an inability to formulate any clear
policy. Concerned about the loss of hard-
won international business, the state was
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unable to propose an acceptable solution
to the conﬂict. But it is at this point that
all the explanatory power, built so carefully
by Nitzan and Bichler throughout the book,
collapses. One can ask: How is it possible
that such a supposedly omnipotent money-
power coalition was unable to put an end
to the damaging conﬂict by forcing the state
to dismantle the settlements in the occu-
pied territories and withdraw to the 1967
borders? The answer seems clear: As with
all deterministic materialist approaches, the
present volume is blind to such issues as
political culture, symbols, national and re-
ligious sentiments, and the various ways in
which these interact with each other on
both sides of the conﬂict. Without including
these forms of human behavior in the anal-
ysis, the theoretical framework suffers from
limited and very partial explanatory power
and even less predictive power.
Nonetheless, we may applaud this book
as an important contribution to the growing
critical scholarship on different aspects of
Israeli society. Accepting that the authors
will not succeed completely in fulﬁlling
their ambitious task, readers still will ﬁnd a
ﬂuent and most enjoyable text that provides
a very rich and vivid picture of the Israeli
economy and its major actors.
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tudes towards the State of Israel focuses on
the historical period following the establish-
ment of the State of Israel in 1948 and con-
tinues up to the election of Ehud Barak as Is-
rael’s prime minister in 1999. Unfortunately,
this volume is less about Christian attitudes
Peter E. Makari is the executive for the Middle
East and Europe of the Common Global
Ministries Board of the United Church of Christ
and Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).
toward Israel and more about the author’s
own views on the subjects he addresses.
First of all, this volume is riddled with
errors and inconsistencies. A comprehen-
sive listing is impossible in this space, but a
small sampling of the author’s treatment of
Arabic words and names gives us a sense.
Merkley transliterates the Arabic word for
Islamic law variously as “shar’ia” (p. 84),
“Shari’a”(p. 91), and “shari’a” (p. 92).
Similarly, he alternately uses “Qu’ran” and
“Qur’an” (p. 105). Merkley provides an in-
correct Arabic transliteration of People of
the Book, “ahl al-khatib” (p. 107), instead
of “ahl al-kitab.” Later on the same page,
he transcribes the Arabic for “protected” as
“dhimii,” and on the next page as “dhimmi”
(p. 108). He refers to the bishop of the Epis-
copal Diocese of Jerusalem as Riad Abu El
Assal (pp. 71, 73), when the bishop’s name
is Riah. I could go on. Such lack of careful
attention means either that the proofread-
ing and editing of this book was far from
adequate or that the author is simply unfa-
miliar with the terms and names (reducing
the author’s credibility in addressing the
topic at hand). Given the thrust of the book,
however, it belies the author’s own lack of
interest in understanding a perspective of
Israel that is widely held by Arab (includ-
ing Palestinian) Christians and a number of
Western churches. The irony is the author’s
criticism of thosewho “simplywill not stoop
to enter into the thought-world of the ad-
versary, even for purposes of understanding
their arguments or learning how to spell
them” (p. 185).
The basic content of the chapters is also
very revealing. In the second chapter, “Chris-
tian Attitudes towards the State of Israel,”
Merkley makes an odd comparison between
the differential in attention the press has
given to Israel and to the World Council of
Churches (WCC) (p. 26), as if to demon-
strate that the WCC is irrelevant. The former
is a nation-state, and the latter is an interna-
tional forum of church communions, so one
would not expect equal attention. Further,
Merkley asserts that the Roman Catholic
Church and the WCC are the two “major
wings of the church.” This description is in-
conceivable since theWCCdoes not purport
to be a “wing” but rather a place for dialogue
among many parts of the universal Church.
Chapter six, on the Roman Catholic Church
is interesting and helpful, but Merkley, as
elsewhere in the book, is not clear in his
deﬁnition of Israel: Does he mean the histor-
ical nation of Jews, the Zionist movement,
